At the final table of an online tournament, we are the chip leader with 125 big blinds. We open the action with 10♦10♥ to 3bb from UTG+1, a standard raise with a strong pocket pair at a nine-handed table. The button, who holds the second-largest stack at 58bb, elects to 3-bet to 7bb. Then, the big blind, sitting on 38bb, ships it all-in. The action folds back to us. Now, what do we do in this moment?

This hand presents a complex decision tree. We’re first faced with analyzing the range and intentions behind the button’s 3-bet, and the big blind’s shove. We also must consider ICM (Independent Chip Model) pressure, final table dynamics, and the relative stack sizes before determining whether a call, re-raise, or fold gives us the best chance of maximizing EV (expected value) and minimizing risk.

We are the clear chip leader at this final table with 125bb. The button, sitting behind us with 58bb, is the only player who can make a huge dent in our stack. The big blind, at 38bb, represents a middling stack—large enough to hurt, but not to cripple.

Opening 10♦10♥ from UTG+1 at a 9-handed final table is standard. While we are in early position, pocket tens are strong enough to open confidently for value and can dominate many medium pairs and broadway hands that might call behind us. The 3bb open is slightly larger than the standard 2-2.5bb size used by the majority of online players but I use this size as part intimidation tactic and part value extractor. A majority of players online call raises rather than 3-bet so sizing up a bit pre-flop extracts a little more value when they fold to our c-bets, which happens the majority of the time. 

The 3-bet from the button to 7bb is our first real warning that we might not have the best hand. It’s a somewhat small sizing, especially against a 3bb open, which could be a deliberate trapping line with a premium hand like AA or KK, or a cautious 3-bet range including hands like AK, AQs, JJ+ that might not want to play for stacks. Given the button’s position and stack size, we must take this 3-bet seriously. They have position, fold equity, and are second in chips. Importantly, they’re not committing a large percentage of their stack—7bb is just 12% of their total. This leaves plenty of room for folds or aggressive plays depending on how the action continues.

As I am contemplating calling the raise or 4-betting the big blind shoves for 38bb, a very strong move after facing a UTG+1 open and a button 3-bet. This move immediately polarizes their range. They are almost always representing AK, JJ+, we can discount any bluff combos since this player has not made any insane bluffs yet (that we know of), and I can easily have a strong hand and intend to re-jam. But at a final table, with significant pay jumps on the line, most players won’t make this move without real strength.

We’re now faced with three options:

1. Call the 38bb shove and allow the button to act behind us.
2. Re-shove to isolate the big blind and hope to fold out the button.
3. Fold and wait for a better spot.

Calling here is the riskiest line because it leaves the button with 51bb and a reopened action. They might fold, giving us a clean shot against the big blind. Or they might re-shove, which puts about half our stack at risk.

Re-jamming signals extreme strength and may fold out the button unless they hold QQ+. If the button was 3-betting light, or with AK, they may fold to our shove, fearing we have KK+. If we isolate the big blind and are up against AK, AQ, or even 99, we’re in great shape. 

Folding tens at a final table after opening and facing this action may feel weak, but it’s defensible. The big blind’s shove is likely a very tight range. The button’s 3-bet already indicated strength. We don’t want to double up our biggest threat or dump off half our stack unnecessarily.  There will certainly be better spots.

Against one of these players out hand isn’t doing too bad in many situations. However, against both of them our 10♦10♥ doesn’t fare well. Against the big blind’s shove alone, we’re flipping at best or dominated at worst. Against both players, our equity crashes—maybe 20–25% at best.

ICM pressure is the real enemy in this hand. We’re chip leader. Two of the bigger stacks at the table are showing strong interest in battling in this pot. Several short stacks are waiting to ladder. If we call or shove and lose to either villain, we forfeit the ability to pressure the rest of the table. 

The best play here, as much as we hate to do it, is to fold. It may feel passive. It may feel weak. But it is ICM correct and EV-conscious in a final table setting. Our open from UTG+1 was good. But once we saw the 3-bet from a dangerous stack and a shove from another one, we have to let this one go.

Hands like this underscore a painful but essential truth in poker: sometimes the right play doesn’t get the best result. In this spot, folding pocket tens felt tight — even cautious — but it was the correct decision. Facing a 3-bet from the second-largest stack and a shove from a solid 38bb stack, all signs pointed to stronger hands. The combination of ICM pressure, final table dynamics, and a clear read that at least one opponent had a higher pair made the fold the most +EV line in the long term.

And then… the results came in.

– The button had QQ and most likely would have called if we jammed.
– The big blind had KK, validating our read.
– The flop bricked, but the turn brought a ten, giving us a set and what would have been a massive pot, eliminating two of the biggest threats and leaving us with an even more massive chip lead.

We would have been the overwhelming favorite to win the tournament right there. But that result doesn’t change the fundamental truth: we were behind two players who had us crushed preflop, and our equity was far too low to justify a call or re-jam. Results don’t justify bad decisions; in poker, the process matters more than the outcome.

Discipline at the final table means laying down strong hands when the situation demands it. Even when it stings. Even when a miracle card comes later. The great players aren’t the ones who always get lucky — they’re the ones who consistently make the best decisions regardless of what the deck does next.

Luckily, I was still able to play solidly at the final table and eventually win the tournament, further illustrating that smart play prevails in the long run.